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Humanitarian Intervention: Evolving Norms, Fragmenting Consensus 
 
(Remarks) 
 
 
Thank you very much. It’s terrific to be here, and thanks to all of you who 
have worked so hard to make this event come about.  
 
In many ways, all of us here today will be telling different versions of the 
same story—in one way or another, we’re all trying to describe the same set of 
phenomena as we contemplate the ways in which norms about humanitarian 
intervention have both evolved and been challenged over the last 20 or so years. 
My own internal working title for my remarks has been “Evolving Norms, 
Fragmenting Consensus,” as I think about humanitarian intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect.  
 
Most of you here today have taken international law. As you know, every 
introductory international law course talks about the sources of international law. 
Specifically, you spend some time talking about customary international law, or 
CIL. Again, as you know, to determine the contours of customary international 
law, we look both to state practice and to “opinio juris”: that is, the degree to 
which states are acting in a certain way out of a sense of legal obligation, rather 
than out of mere habit or convenience.1  
 
Traditionally, the evolution of customary international law was understood 
as a gradual process: in some idealized model, we might see first a few states, and 
then a few more, implicitly agreeing to follow a practice, and then we would 
gradually begin to see additional states doing the same thing. 2 We would also 
gradually accumulate evidence that these various states are acting in such a way 
because they consider themselves legally bound to do so. Then, over time, we’ll 
see more and more states following suit both in word and deed, until at some 
point we can say with a great deal of confidence that such and such has evolved 
into a binding norm of customary international law. 
 
That’s the idealized process through which norms of customary 
international law develop. In real life, of course, it’s rarely so neat and tidy. In 
fact, much of the time, the evolution of customary international law looks less like 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 DAN KUWALI, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4(h) 
INTERVENTION 24 (2011). 
2 See Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 665–67 
(1953) (discussing the development of international law and the competing elements of “usage” 
(patterned actions) and opinio juris). 
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a gradual, trouble-free emergence of consensus than a continual process of 
contestation—a continual process of resistance and conflict between states, if you 
will. By “conflict” I don’t necessarily mean armed force, but rather diplomatic 
conflict of all sorts: dueling demarches, dueling public statements, and so on.  
 
Norms relating to humanitarian intervention offer a typical example. We 
are in a period in which we are seeing a norm struggling to emerge, if you will, 
but that process is not a smooth one, has not been a smooth one, and is unlikely to 
be a smooth one in the future. Indeed, when we think about norms related to 
humanitarian intervention or the Responsibility to Protect, if anything what we 
have seen has been a process of reaction, counter-reaction, counter-counter-
reaction and counter-counter-counter-reaction. We are still going through that 
cycle. 
 
 I’ll talk a little bit later about how this might end, but for now, let me say 
a little bit more about that cycle of reaction and counter-reaction. Let me start by 
offering an extremely abbreviated history of the last two decades of debate about 
humanitarian intervention.  
 
Start in the 1990s. The beginning of the 1990s marked the end of the Cold 
War, and around the world, political leaders, activists, and scholars struggled to 
predict how the Security Council’s role might change with the Cold War deadlock 
finally broken.3 With the omnipresent Cold War threat of a nuclear conflict 
between the Soviet Union and the United States finally over, the threat of proxy 
conflicts between states aligned with one or the other superpowers also came to 
an end.4  
 
But even as the threat of inter-state conflict appeared to recede when the 
Cold War ended, the world began to experience what appeared to be a resurgence 
of messy internal conflicts within states, exemplified by the ethnic conflicts 
Rwanda and Bosnia.5 During the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the international 
community stood by while nearly a million people were slaughtered in a matter of 
a few short months.6 In Bosnia the situation was not quite as shameful for the 
international community, which did ultimately act—with Security Council 
approval—to end the conflict, but most critics felt that the international 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 For example, some scholars worried that the unrestrained, interpretive power of the Security 
Council would be used by the Permanent Five members to determine when and how to intervene 
at their discretion, rather than when it was needed. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the 
UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 12–13 (1994). 
4 Francis M. Deng, The Global Challenge of Internal Displacement, 5 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 141, 
154 (2001). 
5 See generally CAROL MCQUEEN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND SAFETY ZONES: IRAQ, 
BOSNIA AND RWANDA 51–122 (2005) (providing background on the conflicts in Bosnia and 
Rwanda and evaluating the international response to these events). 
6 See id. at 96–122 (evaluating the lack of an international response to the conflict in Rwanda); see 
also JOSHUA J. KASSNER, RWANDA AND THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 1–4 (2013) (providing background information on the Rwandan genocide). 
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community did too little, too late.7 The conflict in the Balkans brought 
concentration camps back to Europe for the first time since World War II. 8 The 
conflict also brought massacres back to Europe: during the Srebrenica massacre in 
1995, for instance, an estimated 8,000 unarmed civilians were slaughtered over a 
few short days. 9  
 
The glaring inadequacy of the international community’s response to the 
crises in Rwanda and Bosnia led to a good deal of hand-wringing, and an 
understandable and appropriate sense of guilt.10 The general sense was that the 
international community—led by the UN Security Council—should have done 
more, or at least should have done something, or really anything in the case of 
Rwanda.11 Political leaders, the media and advocacy groups all asked: Can it 
possibly be the case that it’s acceptable, legally or morally, for the world to stand 
by idly while mass atrocities are committed?  In particular, when mass atrocities 
are committed against a population by its own government?  
 
Then we come to the Kosovo crisis in 1998 and 1999. This has already 
been the subject of much discussion today, so I won’t go into detail. As evidence 
mounted of a renewed ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, it became clear that 
the Security Council would not authorize the use of military force to end Serbian 
ethnic cleansing activities.12 As you know, this was due to veto threats from 
China and Russia, which were driven in part because of broad concerns about 
shoring up norms of sovereign non-intervention, and—on Russia’s end—by the 
historical alliances between Russian and the Serbian authorities.13 This time, 
however, the rest of the international community was unwilling to let Security 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7 See generally Amy Lou King, Bosnia-Herzegovina–Vance-Owen Agenda for Peaceful 
Settlement: Did the U.N. do Too Little, Too Late, to Support this Endeavor? 23 Ga. J. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 347 (1993). 
8 See generally Alan C. Laifer, Never Again? The “Concentration Camps” in Bosnia-
Herzegovina: A Legal Analysis of Human Rights Abuses, 2 NEW EUR. L. REV. 159 (1994) 
(describing both the events of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict and the presence of concentration 
camps in the region). 
9 Timeline: Siege of Srebrenica, BBC (last updated June 9, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/675945.stm. 
 
10 See Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda, in MY 
NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY 49, 49, 51–57 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds. 2004) (outlining 
the problems with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as the inadequacy of 
the international community’s response). 
11 The UN Secretary General commissioned a reporting body to assess the United Nations 
response to the Rwandan genocide and compile a list of suggestions for how the United Nations 
should respond to genocides in the future. Rep. of the Indep. Inquiry into the Actions of the UN 
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 53–54, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999). 
12  Despite recognizing the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo, the 
United Nations maintained a hands-off approach to the conflict; as such, the Security Council 
continued to reaffirm its position that the conflict should be settled peacefully pursuant to the 
provisions of UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. See S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998). 
13 General Rapporteur, Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a Reform of the Security Council?, 
NATO Draft Special Rep. of the Civilian Affairs Committee, ¶ 23 (Sept. 16, 1999). 
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Council inaction be the end of the story. Despite the lack of Security Council 
authorization—and anxious not to see another Rwanda or Bosnia—the NATO 
states decided to take matters into their own hands by launching air strikes against 
Serbian forces.14  
 
It’s worth noting, however, that neither NATO nor the United States, 
which led the NATO operation, attempted to put forward a formal legal 
justification for military intervention in Kosovo.15 The United States and other 
NATO powers offered policy and humanitarian justifications for the use of force, 
but in the United States, there was a deliberate decision at the State Department 
Legal Adviser’s Office to refrain from proffering a legal justification.16  
 
Why not? In part, U.S. and NATO lawyers were unsure if other states 
would accept any legal justification they might put forward, and in part, they were 
afraid that other states would accept their logic. That is, they didn’t want to put 
forward a legal theory that would be roundly repudiated by numerous other states 
because that would be embarrassing and would retard the development of any 
new norm permitting humanitarian intervention. But, they were equally uneasy 
about the longer-term implications of creating a new norm permitting 
humanitarian interventions. No one had fully thought through the long-term 
repercussions of such a new norm, so at least with regard to the law, the NATO 
powers decided that discretion might well be the better part of valor. 17 In effect, 
they opted to leave the Kosovo intervention in the realm of the extralegal and let 
history be the judge.  
 
 History in fact judged the Kosovo intervention fairly kindly.18 Though the 
Council had not authorized the military intervention to start with, it gave what 
amounted to a retroactive blessing by authorizing NATO troops to reestablish 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14 See generally NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO, 
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last updated July 15, 1999) (providing the history of 
NATO’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict). Operation Allied Force began on March 23, 1999 
and lasted until July 10, 1999. Id. 
15 See RAMESH THAKUR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NORMS, LAWS AND THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 48 (2011) (“The Clinton administration defended NATO 
operations, their huge costs, and the even larger costs of the subsequent reconstruction of Kosovo, 
on the argument that something had to be done to oppose totalitarian leaders and stop ethnic 
cleansing and oppression.”). 
16 Id. 
17 See Adam Roberts, NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ Over Kosovo, 41 SURVIVAL 102, 120 (1999) 
(“[M]ost states in the international community are nervous about justifying in advance a type of 
operation which might further increase the power of major powers, and might be used against 
them.”). 
18 See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 58–59 (“Critics of the Kosovo war must concede the many 
positive accomplishments. Almost a million of Kosovo’s displaced inhabitants returned to their 
homeland. Milosevic was thrown out of Kosovo . . . The credibility of NATO was preserved; the 
transformation of its role from collective defence of members against attack from the outside, into 
the more diffused role of peace-enforcement throughout Europe, was validated; and Washington 
remains firmly anchored to Europe.”).  
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security in Kosovo, in close coordination with the UN mission in Kosovo.19 Thus, 
the whole affair worked out pretty well, from a U.S. and NATO perspective. 
While a question mark hovered over the issue of legality, the issue of legitimacy 
seemed to have been satisfactorily addressed.  
 
This, of course, is part of the process through which new norms of 
customary international law are created. Some States act in a certain way; other 
States follow suit, praise the action, or at least refrain from criticism; influential 
States, such as those on the Security Council, appear to accept the legitimacy of 
the acts, and so on. While the States that formed the NATO coalition did not 
articulate the norm in legal terms, one could presume that this would eventually 
come.20  
 
But as I noted earlier, it’s rarely so simple or linear; rather than a steady 
building of consensus, the evolution of customary international law is often 
characterized by contestation and cycles of action, reaction, counter-action and 
counter-reaction. 
 
Shortly after the Kosovo intervention, Kofi Annan, then the UN Secretary 
General, gave a now famous speech.21 In his speech, he articulated the dilemma 
confronting the international community after Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo.22 On 
the one hand, he argued, it seems crystal clear—both morally speaking and from 
the perspective of global stability perspective—that states with the ability to do 
something should not merely stand by while mass slaughter takes place.23 How 
could such inaction possibly be consistent with the norms that led to the creation 
of the UN Charter in the first place?24 Remember, the UN Charter emerged out of 
war, and if it was motivated most centrally by the desire to prevent such horrific 
inter-state conflict from recurring, it was also motivated by revulsion against the 
Holocaust, revulsion against genocide, revulsion against means and methods of 
warfare that killed civilians as much as combatants, and a commitment to human 
dignity and human rights.25  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
19 NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, supra note 14. 
20 See Roberts, supra note 17, at 102–03 (noting one possible legal justification for NATO’s 
involvement in Kosovo and stating that “there are some crimes so extreme that a state responsible 
for them, despite the principle of sovereignty, may properly be the subject of military 
intervention”).  
21 Press Release, General Assembly, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General 
Assembly, U.N. Press Release GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Kofi Annan speech]. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
24 See id. (“The inability of the international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile these 
two equally compelling interests–universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of human 
rights–can only be viewed as a tragedy.”). 
25 Id. 
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On the other hand, Annan highlighted the dangers of permitting states to 
intervene militarily in other states without Security Council authorization.26 If 
doing nothing in the face of genocide offended one key principle on which the 
UN Charter was premised, allowing the unilateral use of force offended the other 
key principle: the conviction that if states could decide for themselves when it’s 
acceptable to use force inside other states (for reasons other than pressing self-
defense), we face a renewed risk of inter-state conflict.27 The norm of sovereign 
non-intervention forms a crucial part of the UN Charter’s collective security 
structure, which prohibits the use of force except when authorized by the Security 
Council.28 But once you accept that sometimes it’s acceptable for one state to use 
armed force inside the borders of another sovereign state for “humanitarian” 
purposes, how do you prevent states from using humanitarian claims as a pretext 
for interventions motivated by ideology or the desire for domination, territory, or 
economic gain? Once you take the Security Council out of the picture, what actor 
can evaluate claims of humanitarian crisis and decide which interventions would 
be justified, and which would be pretextual?   
 
A lot has happened since then, but fifteen years later, in many ways we’re 
still struggling with the same dilemma Kofi Anna articulated in 1999. In 
September 1999, for instance, the Security Council passed Resolution 1265 on the 
protection of civilians in times of armed conflict.29 This was pretty significant, in 
the sense that it was the first time that the Security Council explicitly declared that 
it saw itself not only as the guarantor of peace between states, but as a guarantor 
of civilian protection even in times of internal armed conflicts.30 In Resolution 
1265, the Council “[e]xpresse[d] its willingness to respond to situations of armed 
conflict where civilians are being targeted or humanitarian assistance to civilians 
is being deliberately obstructed, including through the consideration of 
appropriate measures at the Council’s disposal in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations.”31 That may sound anodyne, but in the language of the United 
Nations, this was a huge shift: it brought matters once considered “internal” to 
member states into the Security Council’s declared ambit, and the reference to 
“appropriate measures” was understood by all to signal a willingness on the part 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 Id. (suggesting that the humanitarian response must be applied fairly and consistently regardless 
of region, that intervention must be treated as a last resort, that the international community must 
redefine the meaning of a “national interest,” and that the Security Council must be capable of 
responding to the conflict before a decision to intervene via a military engagement can be made). 
27 See id. (“The choice, as I said during the Kosovo conflict, must not be between Council unity 
and inaction in the face of genocide–as in the case of Rwanda, on the one hand; and Council 
division, and regional action, as in the case of Kosovo, on the other. In both cases, the Member 
States of the United Nations should have been able to find common ground in upholding the 
principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of our common humanity.”). 
28 Id. (“The Charter requires the Council to be the defender of the common interest, and unless it is 
seen to be so—in an era of human rights, interdependence, and globalization—there is a danger 
that others could seek to take its place.”). 
29 S.C. Res. 1265, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1265 (Sept. 17, 1999). 
30 Id. at ¶ 10. 
31 Id. 
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of the Council to authorize the use of armed force, if needed, for humanitarian 
protection purposes. 
 
Meanwhile, efforts continued to find a way out of the dilemma articulated 
by Kofi Annan in 1999. Most notably, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established.32 ICISS consisted of 
noted scholars, diplomats, and former high-level officials, and in November of 
2001, ICISS published a report called “The Responsibility to Protect.”33 In this 
report, ICISS did something smart and novel and in many ways extraordinarily 
appealing. In effect, the ICISS report sought to get out of the supposed dilemma 
between the moral pull of humanitarian intervention and the moral pull of 
sovereignty by redefining the terms of the discussion.34 In particular, ICISS 
sought to redefine sovereignty itself: to ICISS, sovereignty is not something that 
states possess simply by virtue of being states. ICISS took the view that 
sovereignty is a matter of responsibilities as much as rights, and the most 
fundamental responsibility of a sovereign State is the protection of its own 
population.35 The right to be free of external intervention—long considered a 
fundamental attribute of Westphalian sovereignty—is, to ISICC, contingent upon 
a state’s ongoing ability to protect its own population.36 A state that cannot (or 
will not) protect its population loses, to that same extent, the sovereign privilege 
on non-intervention.37 
 
ICISS went a step further, arguing that if a state doesn’t fulfill its 
responsibility to protect its own population, the international community has the 
responsibility to step in and do something if a state fails to fulfill its 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32 INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
VII (Dec. 2001) [hereinafter ICISS REPORT]; THAKUR, supra note 15, at 75 (“Under the impact of 
contrasting experiences in Rwanda and Kosovo, Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged 
member states to come up with a new consensus on the competing visions of national and popular 
sovereignty. Responding to the challenge, Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy set up the 
ICISS to wrestle with the whole gamut of difficult and complex issues involved in the debate.”).  
33 ICISS REPORT, supra note 32. 
34 See id. at 17 (noting the evolution the “right to intervene” concept and redefining it as “the 
responsibility to protect”). The ICCIS defined the responsibility to protect in terms of three 
inherent concepts: 1) evaluation of the issues from the point of view of those in need of support; 2) 
acknowledgment that the primary responsibility to protect rests with the state concerned, and that 
other states may intervene only when the state itself is unwilling or unable to fulfill this 
responsibility or is the perpetrator; and 3) the responsibility to protect includes the responsibility 
to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. Id. 
35 See id. at 13 (stating that acceptance into the UN re-characterizes the idea of sovereignty into 
one where the state becomes responsible for its citizens and their welfare, including both the 
state’s own citizens and those in the international community). 
36 Id. at 17 (“The Commission believes that responsibility to protect resides first and foremost with 
the state whose people are directly affected. This fact reflects not only international law and the 
modern state system, but also the practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive 
difference.”).  
37 Id. 
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responsibility.38 That external intervention can take many, many forms, of course, 
and ICISS was quick to note that most manifestations of the international 
community’s responsibility to protect would and should not be military in 
nature.39 They could be economic interventions (sanctions, foreign aid); they 
could be diplomatic efforts; they could involve various forms of technical 
assistance, and so on.40 But as a last resort—and subject to the standard just war 
principles of right intention, reasonable prospects of success, etc.—the 
international community could turn to armed intervention if needed to protect 
civilian populations.41  
 
Two things are worth noting here. One, note how neatly ICISS avoided the 
dilemma articulated by Kofi Annan in 1999.  Annan articulated a conflict between 
norms of sovereignty and norms of humanitarianism.42 ICISS simply redefined 
sovereignty to avoid the conflict altogether: to ICISS, sovereignty does not stand 
opposed to humanitarian intervention; on the contrary, the most fundamental 
responsibilities of sovereignty revolve around humanitarian protection 
considerations.43 
 
Second, it’s important to note that ICISS saw the Security Council as an 
important but not utterly essential arbiter. While the 2001 ICISS report stated 
clearly that it was the Security Council that should evaluate whether a military 
intervention was justified by a state’s failure to protect its population, the report 
also warned that in particularly compelling and egregious situations, states might 
well be justified in bypassing a paralyzed Security Council.44 Normatively, this 
makes sense: if the legitimacy of states themselves rests upon their individual and 
collective ability to protect the human beings who populate them, then surely the 
legitimacy of a group of states—the Security Council for instance—also similarly 
rests on that ability to protect human beings from egregious and massive harm. By 
implication, if the Security Council is incapable of taking action to protect 
populations under threat, it is, to that same extent, delegitimized, and states opting 
to take matters into their own hands may do so.  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
38 See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 79 (“But if [the state] should default, a residual, fallback 
responsibility also lies with the broader community of states. Where a population is suffering 
serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the government 
in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.”).  
39 See ICISS REPORT, supra note 32, at 29 (“These coercive measures may include political, 
economic or judicial measures, and in extreme cases – but only extreme cases – they may also 
include military action.”). 
40 Id. at 29–31 (outlining the Commission’s stance on non-military interventions as part of the 
international responsibility to protect).  
41 Id. at 31–32. 
42 Kofi Annan Speech, supra note 21. 
43 ICISS REPORT, supra note 32, at 13. 
44 Id. at 54–55. 
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The arguments made by ICISS were both novel and powerful.45 But the 
ICISS report came at an inopportune moment for proponents of humanitarian 
intervention. The September 11 attacks preceded the release of the ICISS report 
by just two months, and the heated debates about humanitarian intervention that 
bedeviled the international community for the previous few years were instantly 
displaced by a new set of concerns about terrorism.46 In this sense, the timing of 
the ICISS report could not have been worse.  
 
That said, the events of 9/11—and the international community’s 
response—could also be viewed as offering further (albeit indirect) support for 
ICISS’s “responsibility to protect” theory and for its understanding of 
sovereignty. 9/11 illustrated the growing difficulty in defining the realm of 
activities that was purely “internal” to a state, versus the realm of issues that can 
be regarded as purely “external.” While ICISS articulated the responsibility to 
protect as triggered by a state’s sustained failure to protect its own population, 
9/11 demonstrated the harms that could result if a state’s failure to control its 
“internal” affairs led to the “export” of harm to the populations of other states.47 
Consider Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Al Qaeda. The Afghan state was unable or 
unwilling to prevent its territory from being used to export massive harm to other 
populations outside of Afghanistan—in the form of the thousands of Americans 
and others injured or killed in the 9/11 attacks.48  
 
In certain senses, then, the immediate post 9/11 period was an opportune 
moment to advance a new theory of sovereignty. The ICISS emphasis on the 
responsibility of states to prevent harm to their own populations dovetailed nicely 
with the post-9/11 insistence—articulated both by the US and by the Security 
Council itself—that states had a responsibility to prevent the export of harm to the 
populations of other states (e.g., by harboring terrorists). 
 
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, many of the post 9/11 U.S. arguments 
for the use of force for counterterrorism purposes parallel Responsibility to 
Protect arguments. Both rest on a similar, though sometimes unarticulated, theory 
of sovereignty as being a matter more of privileges and responsibilities rather than 
rights, and as being “waivable” if a state fails to fulfill its responsibilities. In a 
superficial sense, “responsibility to protect” arguments for humanitarian 
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45 See THAKUR, supra note 15, at 85 (“At a seminar in New York on 15 February 2002, organized 
by the International Peace Academy, most Security Council members seemed supportive of the 
main thrust of the Report.”) 
46 See Thomas G. Weiss, R2P After 9/11 and the World Summit, 24 Wis. Int’l L.J. 74, 747–48 
(2006) (discussing the “more important preoccupations in the aftermath of 9/11”). 
47 See Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams, Report of the Committee of Experts on Nation 
Rebuilding in Afghanistan, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 709, 711 (2002) (“And in response to the 
September 11 attacks, most states have heightened concerns relating to the export of terrorism 
from Afghanistan.”). 
48 See Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FOREIGN AFF. 127, 128 (2002) 
(arguing that many failed states are incapable of effectively governing within their own borders, 
becoming a breeding ground for instability and a troubling situation for world order).   
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intervention and arguments justifying the use of military force to fight terrorism 
might seem a world apart. On a deeper structural level, however, they 
complement each other, and each legitimizes the other.49 
 
But the action/reaction cycle continued, as events in the years after 9/11 
began to complicate nascent support for the “responsibility to protect” norm 
articulated first by ICISS. Most significantly, in 2003, the United States invaded 
Iraq.50 As you know, the Security Council had not authorized the invasion (though 
some made the rather tortured argument that the invasion could be justified via 
the ongoing effect of several pre-9/11 resolutions).51  The invasion was mainly 
premised on a legal theory justifying acts of “preemptive self-defense,” the notion 
being that while Saddam Hussein had not yet used the weapons of mass 
destruction he allegedly possessed, he might at any time use them against the 
United States, and the United States was therefore justified in taking preemptive 
action to eliminate the threat.52 But within a few years, it became clear that 
rationale for the invasion of Iraq had relied, at best, on a misunderstanding or 
exaggeration of the nature of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s regime.53 At 
worst, and in the eyes of many around the world, the invasion was based simply 
on a deliberate effort to misinform both the American public and the world.54  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
49 See ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO END MASS 
ATROCITIES 33 (2009) [hereinafter BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (“The whole concept 
of the R2P rests on the idea that sovereignty and human rights are two sides of the same coin, and 
not opposing principles locked in interminable struggle, as is often portrayed.”). 
50 Act of Oct. 16, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107−243, 116 Stat. 1498 (authorizing for use of military force 
against Iraq).  
51 See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002) (“Recalling that its resolution 678 
(1990) authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its 
resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant resolutions subsequent to resolution 660 
(1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area.”); S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
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(determining that the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq is a “breach of international peace and security” 
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was in material breach of the terms of the 1991 cease-fire, but it refused to authorize the use of 
force to redress the situation.”). 
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the Responsibility to Protect, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 135, 146 (2008) [hereinafter Bellamy, 
Conflict Prevention] (“To make matters worse, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was portrayed as an 
exercise of preventive war ⎯ particularly by Vice-President Dick Cheney.”). 
53 S. REP. NO. 108−301, at 12 (2004) (finding that the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 
National Intelligence Estimate, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
mischaracterized the intelligence through overstatement and lack of support). 
54 See James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with 
Iraq? 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 25, 25−26 (2004) (concluding that the Bush Administration’s “claims 
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 To the international community, the U.S. invasion of Iraq served as a 
powerful reminder of the dangers of permitting States to use force without 
Security Council authorization, and undermined structurally similar arguments 
addressing humanitarian intervention.55 In the case of the Kosovo intervention, 
the legitimate ends (stopping the ethnic cleansing that was undeniably underway) 
were accepted by most states as justifying the extra-legal means (the use of force 
without Security Council authorization).56 Perhaps the same might have happened 
in Iraq. It’s one of history’s many “what ifs”: what if the United States had ousted 
Saddam Hussein, but had not pushed through de-Baathification and had not 
disbanded the Iraqi army? What if the U.S. invasion had produced a genuinely 
stable, peaceful, and democratic Iraq? Perhaps, in those circumstances, the 
international community might have been prepared to overlook the evidence 
demonstrating that Iraq had never possessed weapons of mass destruction.  But 
that’s not what happened: the U.S. military intervention was not only justified 
based on misinformation, but was generally perceived as having done more harm 
than good both for the Iraqi people and for regional stability.57 For several years, 
the Iraq fiasco powerfully discredited other kinds of arguments about military 
intervention.58 
 
But time passes, and again the pendulum swung back—at least for a time. 
President George W. Bush was succeeded by President Barack Obama, who, at 
least as a candidate, was sharply critical of Bush era doctrines of preemptive 
armed conflict and associated attitudes towards military intervention.59 Obama 
promised to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq and bring the conflict in Afghanistan 
to a responsible end, and these promises eased the concerns of many in the 
international community.60 Even as then-candidate Obama repudiated the Bush 
doctrine of preemptive self-defense, other influential members in his 
administration—such as Samantha Power and Susan Rice—publicly embraced the 
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55 See Bellamy, Conflict Prevention, supra note 52, at 144  (arguing that the international 
community, particularly those states likely to be on the receiving end of preventative measures, 
worried that a broader license for intervention could be used to serve the self-interests of powerful 
nations). 
56 But see BJOLA, supra note 51, at 132 (arguing that the legal basis for the Iraq invasion was 
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several UN resolutions adopted after the 1991 Gulf War). 
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insurgents into a “well-developed terrorist network”). 
58 See Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect, supra note 49, at 68 (“[C]onstructive debate about the 
R2P was hampered by the US-led invasion of Iraq”); Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to 
Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 
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59 Barack Obama, Speech on Iraq (Oct. 12, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/12/21/obama.trans.iraq/). 
60 Id. 
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Responsibility to Protect, and began to aggressively push it at the United Nations 
level, urging the Security Council to reference and endorse the concept.61 
 
They succeeded, in part as a result of a burst of international good will 
towards the new Obama administration, and reduced suspicion of the United 
States internationally.62 The Security Council made positive reference to the 
responsibility to protect in several resolutions,63 and the concept reached its 
apotheosis in March of 2011, when the Security Council authorizing the use of 
force to protect civilians both in Libya (where NATO took the lead) and in Cote 
d’Ivoire (where UN peacekeepers assisted by French troops used force to restore 
civil order following post-election violence).64 In both cases, the Council 
expressly invoked the Responsibility to Protect.65 
 
This was the high water point for the R2P norm.66 After Libya and Cote 
D’Ivoire, there was a brief period in which numerous commentators declared that 
R2P had finally “grown up,” achieving, or certainly getting within spitting 
distance, the status of a norm of customary international law.67 
 
That period lasted only about three months, however.68 Within months, the 
Libya intervention began to appear at least to critics more like a regime change 
intervention than a civilian protection intervention.69 Perhaps this was inevitable: 
it’s not clear how an intervention intended to protect civilians from predation by 
their own government could avoid morphing into a regime change intervention in 
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61 Ambassador Samantha Power, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dialogue 
on the Responsibility to Protect (Sept. 11, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/214066.htm); Ambassador Susan E. Rice, U.S. 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Remarks at the International Peace Institute 
Vienna Seminar (June 15, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/125977.htm). 
62 See Peter Baker, Good Will, but Few Foreign Policy Benefits for Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/us/politics/20prexy.html?_r=0. 
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64 S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 63; S.C. Res. 1975, supra note 63. 
65 Id. 
66 Gareth Evans, Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World, China Institute of International 
Studies Conference (Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Evans, Responsible Protection].  
67 Id. See, e.g., Gareth Evans, Responding to Mass Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) After Libya and Syria, Public Lecture at the Central European School of Public Policy (Oct. 
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68 Evans, Central European University Lecture, supra note 67. 
69 Id.; see also Solomon A. Dersso, The African Union, in AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 220, 242 (Gentian Zyberi & Kevin T. Mason eds., 2013) (suggesting 
that the way in which Security Council Resolution 1973 was executed further heightened the 
concerns that civilian protection was just a pretext for a regime change). 
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the face of continued government attacks on civilians. Regardless, the shift 
towards a straightforward attack on Libyan government forces triggered anxiety 
and anger in many states, including, most notably, Russia, China, and South 
Africa.70 In their eyes, the United States had arguably tricked the Security Council 
into authorizing force for a limited, humanitarian purpose—and had then quickly 
moved to depose a sitting government.71 Even if the United States and other 
NATO powers had not initially intended the intervention to expand, argued 
critics, the conflict in illustrated that using force for civilian protection purposes 
could easily end up having unintended consequences.72   
 
So the pendulum once again swung away from norms favoring 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect and towards an 
insistence on sovereign non-intervention—or, at the very least, a deep wariness of 
interventionist arguments. This is reflected in the UN debate about Syria, where, 
despite some 100,000 deaths, the Security Council has been unwilling even to use 
“responsibility to protect” terminology in connection with the conflict.73  
 
In the United States, President Obama seems to have taken this to heart, as 
evidenced by his conflicted response to events in Syria.74 President Obama has 
made it clear he has no appetite for a unilateral humanitarian intervention 
intended to protect civilians; inside sources suggest that he is as concerned about 
slippery slopes as any U.S. critic.75 In August and September of 2013, however, 
Obama—trapped by his own rhetorical declaration that the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria would cross a U.S. “red line”—briefly declared his willingness 
to use military force for the limited purpose of ending the Assad regime’s ability 
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70 Evans, Central European University Lecture, supra note 67. 
71 Louis Charbonneau, Russia U.N. Veto on Syria Aimed at Crushing West’s Crusade, REUTERS 
(Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-un-russia-
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72 See Evans, Responsible Protection, supra note 66 (suggesting that an unintended consequence 
in the wake of the Libyan intervention is the extreme difficulty to gain un-vetoed authorization by 
the UN Security Council for the future use of force for civilian protection, due in large part to the 
mistrust of United States, United Kingdom, and France by the BRICS nations).    
73 Id.  
74 Compare President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps. 
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to use chemical weapons against his citizens.76 In the process, he articulated a 
legal argument justifying the potential unilateral use of force for the purpose of 
protecting civilians, even in the absence of Security Council authorization.77 The 
United Kingdom’s prime minister did the same, asserting explicitly that a 
humanitarian intervention would be lawful under the circumstances.78 In the 
United States, the United Kingdom and France, key surrogates—such as former 
U.S. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh—also advanced arguments 
justifying a potential U.S. intervention in Syria.79 
 
These arguments were far from universally accepted.80 The response both 
from domestic U.S. constituencies and even many close U.S. allies was sharply 
critical.81 The British parliament declined to authorize British participation in any 
use of force in Syria,82 and in the United States, it seems quite likely than 
Congress would have done the same.83 Ultimately, they were not put to the test, as 
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the United States opted against military action when Syria’s government agreed to 
surrender its chemical weapons under international supervision.84 
 
There’s an interesting irony here: the legal case for unilateral humanitarian 
intervention was articulated most explicitly by several powerful states at the very 
moment support for a norm permitting such interventions was at its weakest in 
many other states. On the one hand, the Syria debate saw three permanent 
members of the Security Council go well beyond previous expressions of support 
for the responsibility to protect and explicitly embrace the view that humanitarian 
interventions are lawful even in the absence of Security Council authorization. On 
the other hand, the Syria debate also shored up opposition to norms permitting 
humanitarian intervention, as Russia, China, and other states weighed in to 
express their opposition.  
 
To put it a little differently, norms supporting military intervention for 
humanitarian purposes—even unilateral intervention—have evolved substantially 
in the last two decades, both as a result of the 2001 ICISS report and as a result of 
the subsequent embrace of the responsibility to protect by the United States and 
other influential states. But even as norms supporting humanitarian intervention 
have been articulated, elaborated, and placed on a firmer theoretical and legal 
footing, becoming linked to changing norms about sovereignty more generally, 
the international consensus supporting such humanitarian interventions has never 
been in greater disarray since the end of the Cold War.85  
 
So where are we now, given this cycle of action, reaction, and counter-
reaction: Do we have a norm of customary international law permitting 
humanitarian intervention, or not? And what does the future hold? What does the 
ongoing debate about interventions tell us about the world in which we live? 
 
On the first question, I think the honest answer is that customary 
international law is in some disarray on this subject. It would be going too far—
after Kosovo, after the Syria debate—to assert that customary international law 
clearly prohibits any and all humanitarian interventions undertaken without 
Security Council blessing. But it would also be going too far to assert that such 
interventions are clearly permitted under customary international law. The law is 
unsettled and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
 
This shouldn’t surprise us. In many ways, the debate about humanitarian 
intervention is both part of and a symbol of a broader struggle to understand what 
sovereignty can possibly mean in a globalized era. These days, it’s impossible to 
draw clear lines between the internal and the external–the foreign and the 
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85 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect in Action, THE COURIER 4, 5 (2012) (arguing that 
the paralysis of the Security Council to act regarding Syria partially results from Russian 
“realpolitik,” push back from the BRICS regarding the NATO-led coalition in Libya overstepping 
its UN mandate, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France pushing for R2P solution). 
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domestic.86 What can sovereignty mean, in an era in which “internal” civil 
conflict easily spills beyond borders, and in which modern communications 
technologies—Twitter, YouTube, and so on—make the moral impact of conflict 
global and immediate? Looked at through the lens of economics or climate or 
public health, borders are increasingly meaningless, and states have less and less 
ability to function autonomously. (In some states, all states today intervene 
constantly in the internal affairs of all other states, whether they know it or not—
and even whether they like it or not).87 From a security perspective, too, 
traditional conceptions of sovereignty have been undermined: as the 9/11 attacks 
made clear, what happens in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen) cannot be expected 
to stay in Afghanistan (or Mali or Yemen).88 Lethal harm can be exported across 
borders more rapidly—and by an ever-widening range of non-state actors—than 
ever before.  
 
Indeed, it’s no coincidence that arguments about the use of force for 
counterterrorism purposes are structurally similar to arguments about the 
responsibility to protect. If a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect its own 
population makes it subject to external intervention for the purpose of population 
protection, why shouldn’t a state’s inability or unwillingness to protect other 
states’ populations from the consequences of activities inside its borders render it 
similarly subject to external intervention? (Note that this is not the same as 
traditional arguments justifying the use of force in national self-defense, though it 
overlaps with such arguments. The theory of sovereignty that undergirds the 
responsibility to protect offers an alternative logic justifying intervention. A logic 
that, taken to its extreme, would allow states considering military intervention to 
bypass traditional requirements of imminence and use force even when the threats 
are directed at third-party states). 
 
 I find myself actually profoundly ambivalent about all this. The 
arguments that have emerged in favor of the responsibility to protect—and 
indeed, for counterterrorism-based interventions—have a tremendous amount of 
moral legitimacy to them in this globalized world. At the same time, however 
inadequate we may find traditional conceptions of sovereignty, sovereignty is one 
of the sole bulwarks against a renewed era of interstate conflict. Because Kofi 
Annan’s 1999 warnings still ring true: once you open up the door to unilateral 
military intervention—once you have a norm permitting a single state to decide 
for itself when a situation justifies the use of armed force—what will prevent a 
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slide back towards the kind of dangerous free-for-all the UN Charter was 
designed to prevent? 
 
 This is where we are right now, and we don’t have the answer to that 
dilemma. In an ideal sense, the way out of this dilemma lies in developing more 
robust, responsive and accountable forms of international governance. That’s the 
logic of the situation in which we find ourselves: in the age of globalization, we 
need, more than ever, an empowered global referee committed both to stability 
and to human dignity—a global referee that can make these difficult decisions 
about when and where to use force, so it’s not just one state’s views against 
another’s.  
 
 We don’t, of course, have anything close to this more robust system of 
international governance right now. We should surely strive for it—it is surely in 
the ultimate interest of all states. How else can we prevent the erosion of 
traditional norms of sovereignty from leading to a slide towards conflict and 
instability? How else can we address urgent collective problems such as climate 
change?  
 
 I’m not particularly optimistic that we will get there, however. In the not-
so-distant past, we humans demonstrated a remarkable incapacity to make clearly 
necessary changes incrementally and peacefully. Think of the major inflection 
points in international law: the Peace of Westphalia, or the post World War II 
creation of the UN Charter system.89 The bursts of creativity and change 
symbolized by the emergence of the Westphalian order or the UN system did not 
emerge out of peaceful collaboration between States.90 On the contrary, these 
dramatic changes in the international system arose out of cataclysm. The religious 
wars that wracked Europe before the Peace of Westphalia left nearly a third of the 
population dead in parts of Central Europe.91 World Wars I and II were nearly as 
devastating, leaving tens of millions dead and many of Europe’s great cities in 
ruins.92 
 
 There is nothing inevitable about progress (in the international domain or 
any other domain). Perhaps today’s international system will gradually and 
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peacefully morph into a more powerful, equitable, and effective system of global 
governance—but perhaps it won’t. Perhaps instead the current system will 
collapse as catastrophically as the pre-World War II international order. Change is 
inevitable, but it not inevitably for the better; even when the ultimate outcome is 
good, the process of change may be neither pleasant nor gentle.  We think of the 
post World War II UN Charter system as “better” that the rules and institutions 
that preceded it—but that “better” system could only be built on the ruins of the 
old system.  
 
 It will take a really concerted effort and a whole lot of luck for us to 
stagger and stumble our way towards a stronger, more stable, and more human 
rights friendly international system. If we don’t have that much like, and we may 
very well not, we would easily find ourselves back in a situation of very 
substantial global instability and conflict.  
 
 This is the central insight I struggle to communicate when I teach 
international law. We all have such a “presentist” bias. We assume that today’s 
weather is the best predictor of tomorrow’s weather, and statistically, so it is: 
tomorrow’s weather is overwhelmingly likely to resemble today’s weather. Until 
the day it doesn’t, that is. Similarly, we assume that tomorrow, the international 
order will probably look a whole lot like it looks today. This will also be true, 
right up to the day it’s not.  Think of it like this: none of our intelligence agencies 
predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the Arab Spring and the rapid ouster 
of several Middle Eastern despots, for that matter.93 Systems can seem very 
stable, but the fact that a system has not yet collapsed doesn’t mean it’s in a state 
of equilibrium.94 Unstable systems can persist for long periods then collapse very 
suddenly.95  
 
 This, then, is the central challenge for those of you who care about 
international law: we inhabit an unstable international order premised on 
increasingly contested norms. Can we do anything to ensure the resiliency and 
adaptability of the current system—can we help nudge it towards something more 
responsive and robust? Or will we just watch in dismay as it falls to pieces around 
us?  
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